

Q. # 1250

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE AMERICAN  
AND JAPANESE DELEGATIONS, OCTOBER 29, 1934, AT  
CLARIDGE'S

## Present:

For the United States:

Mr. Davis  
Admiral Standley  
Mr. Wilson  
Mr. Atherton  
Mr. Dooman  
Commander Schuirmann  
Mr. Field

For Japan:

Mr. Matsudaira  
Admiral Yamamoto  
Captain Iwashita  
Mr. Mizota  
Mr. Kato

Mr. Matsudaira began by asking what should be discussed. Mr. Davis said that he supposed there was nothing much to be discussed since the Japanese had told us they had largely covered their position in the previous talk. He had a few questions, however, which he desired to ask for clarification. He desired to know for instance whether the common upper limit proposed by Japan would be the same also for France and Italy. Admiral Yamamoto replied that France and Italy should have the right to build up to the same limit although if they desired to come to some other arrangement as between themselves they should be free to do so since they are far removed from Japan and the United States. When Mr. Davis pointed to the proximity of Great Britain, the Admiral said Japan would have no objection to Great Britain also making special arrangements with France and Italy. Mr. Matsudaira emphasized that since Japan insisted on the principle of equality, she had no right to prevent others from claiming this also.

Mr. Matsudaira told the American Delegation that at the last meeting between the Japanese and British Delegations they had continued to talk about general principles. The British had asked questions to which the Japanese had replied.

They had subsequently had talks between Admiral Yamamoto and his experts and the First Sea Lord and his experts. Mr. Davis wondered whether the Japanese were prepared to give us the information they had given the British in their technical meetings. Mr. Matsudaira said that they were ready to do so but felt it would be better at a separate meeting. Admiral Yamamoto, on the other hand, said that while he would welcome an exchange of ideas on both sides, he could not see to what extent a discussion of details would contribute to a solution of fundamental questions. The most important part of their plan was the fundamental policy embodied therein and the details were intimately connected with this policy. Admiral Yamamoto stated that they had discussed technical details with the British only on the understanding that the latter had agreed to the basic principles of the Japanese proposal. Upon being questioned on this point, Mr. Matsudaira said we had misunderstood and that in the technical discussions with the British they had presented their technical views on the assumption of ultimate acceptance of the principles of their plan. Should these principles be rejected, the technical views - for instance, those relating to qualitative limitations - would have to be modified. "I look upon technical questions as of secondary importance. The question of policy and principles is of primary importance. While we are willing to proceed to our talk on technical questions, we look upon the question of the common upper limit as of paramount importance, so that we cannot consider the discussions of qualitative limitation, such as unit size, as being final unless a decision can be reached to fix a common upper limit." In response to the questions from Mr. Davis, Admiral Yamamoto clarified his position by stating that, "The discussion of details does not prejudice the attitude on general principles .....Because the principle of the common upper limit is looked upon as the most important feature by the Japanese Navy, we considered our position on other questions might have to be modified if the common upper limit is not accepted". Mr. Davis stated that there was no disagreement as to this point; neither side would commit itself in these technical discussions. It was simply a matter of a further elucidation and clarification of the Japanese position in order that we might give them a full and fair consideration. The United States, Mr. Davis explained, had no detailed technical proposals to advance. "We were in favor of maintaining and continuing the two treaties except that we would advocate reductions and, if they were acceptable, we would be willing to discuss with an open mind the technical details of how to carry out this general program. Thus if there were an agreement for a 20%



reduction, it would be a problem for our experts to examine how to carry it out in the various categories, but there was no use of our going into details of this sort unless there were agreement on general principles.

Admiral Yamamoto here objected that if only the Japanese were to explain their technical views, it would not be very useful to have a meeting of experts. Mr. Davis asked whether the British had given the Japanese their technical views, to which Mr. Matsudaira replied, "Oh, yes, clearly". The Japanese insisted that the last meeting with the British had consisted largely of a presentation of the detailed program of the British. Mr. Matsudaira continued, "We are not particularly anxious to have these technical matters, but we thought you might have some views to present just as in the case of the British". [Admiral Yamamoto, in further explanation of his position regarding technical discussions, repeated that the Japanese attitude on technical matters was very immediately related to the fundamental spirit of their proposals; to illustrate, they were advocating the abolition of aircraft carriers; if they had aggressive designs in the Far East, nothing would be more useful than the retention of aircraft carriers. Similarly, if they intended aggression, they would favor abolition of submarines since they are useful only for defense of their home waters. "I consider that the real aim of our proposal goes beyond the setting of a common upper limit. I look upon the spirit of our proposal as being to reduce the menace of war and to make it more difficult to wage war. In technical discussions, on the other hand, we consider the problem of how to carry on war most advantageously, which is the opposite of the purpose of our discussions." Mr. Davis was in hearty accord with the idea of removing the incentive of fighting. He said that our idea had always been to give each of the three principal Powers equality of security and to remove the cause for their going to war against each other.

Mr. Davis then inquired whether the American views were so very different from those of the British, to which Mr. Matsudaira replied that the Japanese did not know exactly what the British thought of the Japanese program. At this point he emphatically declared that it was the Japanese intention to denounce the Washington Treaty before the end of the year and then to try to find some basis for an agreement satisfactory to all.

In reply to Mr. Matsudaira's question as to what we would discuss with the British in the afternoon, Mr. Davis explained that this would be our first meeting since last July and that we had no definite agenda. We had not come to London with any plan for an entirely new agreement on a new basis, but merely with the idea of continuing the Treaties or of concluding a new one which would continue the purposes of the Washington and London Treaties. Mr. Matsudaira here injected that we had surely given the British our detailed program last summer, since we had had technical discussions at that time. Mr. Davis stated that the British had given to us their views on technical questions but that we did not present our technical views since we did not have any to present. Our program then as now had simply been for a 20% reduction, the details to be worked out later.

The two delegations then continued to consider the possibility of technical discussions. Mr. Davis advanced the suggestion that Admiral Standley and Admiral Yamamoto sit down together and talk the matter over in detail. He explained that while he did not believe that there was any opportunity to try to reach an agreement on technical questions, his idea was simply to enable Admiral Standley to obtain a clear understanding of what the Japanese proposals meant in practice. Mr. Matsudaira, speaking in Japanese to Mr. Dooman, stated that they did not have any hard and fast technical program. Their idea was that as the conversations went forward the technical problems on both sides would develop in such a manner as to make it possible to bring the opposing technical views closer together and to reconcile them.

After further discussions it was agreed that no decision should now be reached on the matter of a technical meeting, but that there would be another informal meeting between the two delegations at which the question could be dealt with. Mr. Davis said that the American Delegation would like to pay a return visit on the Japanese and would do so some time after the meeting scheduled for the afternoon with the British.



INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 6250

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, James O. Richardson, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the United States Government in the following capacity:

Admiral, United States Navy, Retired, on duty in the  
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department,  
temporarily assigned to duty with the Supreme Commander  
for the Allied Powers in connection with the International  
Military Tribunal for the Far East.

I further certify that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 7 pages, dated October 29, 1934, and described as follows: "Memorandum of Conversations between the  
American and Japanese Delegations, October 29, 1934, at Claridges."

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the United States Government and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named Department: \_\_\_\_\_

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department,  
United States Government.

Witnessed this 14th day

of November 1946.

/s/ JAMES O. RICHARDSON  
Signature of Official

/s/ JAMES J. ROBINSON  
Captain, USNR  
#52853

Admiral, U.S. Navy, Retired  
Official Capacity

一九三四年（昭和九年）十月二十  
九日「クワリツヂ」ニ於ケル米  
國及び日本代表者間會談覺察抜萃

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山本大將ハ技術上ノ討論ニ於ケル自分ノ  
立場ヲ眞ニ明ラカニスル爲メニ技術問題  
ニ對スル日本側ノ態度ハ彼等（日本側）  
ノ提案ノ根本精神ト直接ニ關係シテ  
キタコトヲ例ヘバ彼等（日本）ガ航空母  
艦ノ廢止ヲ唱道シタ如キヲ繰返シタ。若  
シ彼等（日本側）東亞侵略ノ意圖ア  
リトスルナラバ航空母艦ノ保持理有利ナ  
モノハナイデアアラ

Checked on Oct 27  
OK



近東國際軍事裁判所

證 明 書

題 目 合衆國政府ノ文書保管ニ關スル證明

余、即チ米國海軍大將（退役）ジエームズ・オー・<sup>James O.</sup>  
リチャードソン、<sup>Richardson</sup>ハ下記陳述ヲナス。

- 一、余ハ一九三八年／昭和十三年／六月ヨリ一九三九年／昭和十四年／六月マデ海軍人事局長、一九四〇年昭和十五年／一月ヨリ一九四一年／昭和十六年／二月マデ米國艦隊司令長官トシテ在任セリ。一九四一年／昭和十六年／三月、余ハ海軍省總務部々員ニ任命サレ一九四二年／昭和十七年五月マデ引續キ同職ニ在任セリ。
- 二、自分ハ總務部々員トシテ同省ノ記録及ビ綴ニ精通シラレリ
- 三、現在國際檢察部文書第六二五〇號トシテ指定セラレアル文書「一九三四年／昭和九年／十月二十九日附クレアツプニ於ケル日米代表會議覺書」ハ一九三五年／昭和十年／ロンドン海軍軍縮會議米國代表ニ依リロンドンニ於テ作成セラレタル覺書ノ真正且正確ナル寫シニシテ、現在首府ワシントン海軍省總務部ノ記録及ビ綴ノ一部ニ

シテ公衆保管ニリ提出セラレタルモノナルコト  
ヲ茲ニ證明ス。

*James O. Richardson*  
シヘー・オー・リチャードソン (署名)

一九四六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ九月四日立會セリ

(証人) *James J. Robinson*  
シヘー・オー・ロビンソン (署名)

米國海軍退役大佐

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極東國際軍事裁判所  
證明書

國際檢察部第六三五〇號

與據及公正之陳述

余 JAMES O. RICHARDSON  
ジエームス・オー・リチャードソン ハ 余が下記之資格ヲ  
即チ海軍省、海軍作戰部、長室勤務、極東國際  
軍事裁判所ニ關シ聯合軍最高司令官附トシテ臨時  
勤務、退役米國海軍大將トシテ合衆國政府ト公的  
關係ニ在ルモノナリト茲ニ證明ス。

余ハ更ニ該官吏トシテ余ニ添附セラルル七百三  
成ノ千九百三十四年ノ昭和九年ノ十月二十九日附  
下記題名、即チ「CLARIDGE」ニ於ケル一九三四年ノ昭和九年  
十月二十九日ノ米國對日本代表團ノ會議記錄ノ文  
書、保管ニ任ジ居ルコトヲ證明ス。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ記錄及文書ヨリ合衆國政府、公文  
書ナルコト、並ニ右ノ下記名稱、部局、即チ合衆國  
政府、海軍省、海軍作戰部、長室、公文書類等  
綴、一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。

千九百四十六年昭和二十一年十月十四日是ニ署名ス

當該官吏署名欄  
右ノ者ノ公的資格  
証入

JAMES O. RICHARDSON  
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退役米國海軍大將

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